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Abstract
This paper examines how a fiscal equalization system affects the disciplining effect of
competition for capital among heterogeneous regions in a decentralized economy. I
build a model in which regions that are heterogeneous in initial endowments try to
attract capital by competing public input that enhances the productivity of capital;
meanwhile, a fiscal equalization system is imposed by the central government to reduce
regional disparities in fiscal capacity. The key prediction, borne out in data from the
German equalization system, is that while competition for capital strengthens discipline in the well-endowed regions, it weakens discipline in the poorly-endowed regions.
However, a conventional equalization transfer scheme, common to many countries, can
be effective in correcting the distortion driven by the heterogeneity of initial endowments across competing regions.
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Introduction

Competition for capital is known to have important disciplining effect on governments’ expenditure behavior. This is so because the fear of capital outflows motivates governments to
invest more in public input, such as infrastructure that enhances the productivity of capital,
while spending less on non-productive public consumption (Keen and Marchand, 1997; Qian
and Roland, 1998; Schulze and Ursprung, 1999; Sørensen, 2004; Egger and Falkinger, 2006).1
The standard model in the fiscal competition literature relies on the assumption of homogeneous competing regions. Most authors agree on a symmetric equilibrium in which regions
converge to the same policies; thus, competition for capital implies a uniform disciplining
effect on all regions.2 Cai and Treisman (2005, henceforth C&T) question the validity of this
homogeneity assumption and argue that competition for capital in a decentralized economy
with heterogeneous regions in initial endowments leads to a “one-sided” disciplining effect.
That is, only well-endowed regions end up with more public input; poorly-endowed regions,
in anticipation of losing the game, will simply give up on competition and turn to more
non-productive public consumption.3
Despite a more reality-relevant model, C&T’s analysis is restricted to the situation in
which decentralization is implemented without any intervention from the central government.
As a stylized feature of many decentralized economies, however, a system of fiscal equaliza1

Whether this disciplining effect of competition for capital is harmful or beneficial is still under debate.
Opponents argue that the disciplining effect is gained at the expense of social welfare and environmental
standards (Cumberland, 1981; Rom et al., 1998; Wilson, 1999; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2004).
2
See Dembour (2008) for a survey of literature on competitive location policies. For surveys of the tax
competition literature in general, see Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Wildasin (2004).
3
This observation has strong policy implications for the current ongoing decentralization process in
many countries in which asymmetries in natural resources, human capital, or infrastructure are quite common across different regions. Decentralization reforms would therefore give rise to divergent expenditure
policies by regional governments in these countries; with initially better endowed regions emphasizing more
productive expenditure policies while initially less well-endowed regions doing the opposite. Consequently,
initial regional disparity is anticipated to get larger in heterogeneously endowed countries. Empirically, C&T
provide suggestive evidence from Russia’s market liberalization reform that regions with better initial endowments tend to spend proportionally more on infrastructure and develop more effective market institutions
than regions with poor initial endowments. In the case of China, Zhang (2006) shows that initial heterogeneous endowments relating to economic structures and fiscal burdens help explain how fiscal decentralization
has favored initially better-endowed regions and exacerbated existing regional gaps.
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tion similar to those existing in many countries, such as Canada, Germany or Switzerland, is
observed and is deemed to be a key policy instrument in the hands of the central government
for tackling existing disparities among poorly- and well-endowed regions. In this paper, I
extend the basic model of C&T to include a common form of equalization transfers that
distributes funds to regions on the basis of the representative tax system (RTS) methodology,4 show that the system of equalization sets disincentives for regional governments to
raise investment in public input, and argue that this finding has important implications for
correcting the above “one-sided” disciplining effect within the equalization system.
After developing the model, I test it empirically with data from Germany for the following
three reasons. First, tax legislation is highly centralized at the federal level in Germany.
Tax rates are, therefore, uniform across states (Länder), which fits well with the model
assumption that “tax rates are fixed at the federal level”.5 Second, the full implementation
of the complex equalization system, which combines both “horizontal” redistribution of tax
revenues between rich and poor states and “vertical” transfers from the federal government,
implies varied extents of equalization among states with different fiscal capacities–a feature
that is important for the empirical identification. Third, the recent reunification of East and
West Germany provides a “natural” classification of the poorly-endowed and well-endowed
regions, which is essential to empirically test the asymmetric policy responses of initially
heterogeneous regions as a result of competition for capital.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Theoretically, by incorporating fiscal equalization program, which typically operates in many federal countries, into C&T’s original model,
this paper captures a relatively larger aspect of the decentralized economies and provides
further insight into the disciplining effect of competition for capital among heterogeneous
regions. In particular, the theory reveals that an equalization scheme imposes an implicit
tax on a region’s revenue that is generated by its public input policy. Thus, if the equal4

This approach, similar to the ones employed in Smart (1998, 2007) and Köthenbürger (2002), is discussed
in the next section of this paper
5
See the model setup in the next section of this paper.
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ization scheme initially confronts well-endowed regions with a higher marginal tax rate on
any additional revenues produced by investment in public input relative to initially poorlyendowed regions, then well-endowed regions have a relatively lower incentive to expand the
tax base by choosing higher levels of public input. As a consequence, the original divergent
expenditure policies on public input between poorly- and well-endowed regions, driven by
the heterogeneity of initial endowments, will be mitigated by the asymmetric incentives of
the two types of regions in response to the equalization system.
Empirically, I find strong evidence supporting the theoretical predictions. Using a panel
dataset of German states covering the period between 1995-2007, my estimation results confirm C&T’s original hypothesis that initially well-endowed states (i.e., West German states)
tend to spend a higher proportion on public input than their poorly-endowed counterparts
(i.e., East German states). Further, my estimation that identifies the role of the equalization
system suggests a negative impact of a state’s own marginal tax rate of equalization and
a positive impact of the competing states’ marginal tax rate of equalization, on the state’s
expenditure on public input. This result validates the theoretical implication that the equalization system can be used to serve as a mechanism to correct the “one-sided” disciplining
effect driven by competition among heterogeneous regions.

1.1

Review of the Related Literature

Since equalization systems distribute fiscal transfers to regions in a way that correlates inversely with their fiscal capacities, and these fiscal capacities are largely affected by strategic
interactions among competing regions, a number of scholars have observed that fiscal equalization may induce significant incentive effects on the taxing policy of regional governments
and eventually alter the equilibrium outcome of tax competition. As initially outlined by
Boadway and Flatters (1982) and later formally modeled by several others, such as Smart
(1998), Köthenbürger (2002, 2004, 2005), and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), fiscal equalization schemes are shown to be able to limit tax competition and improve efficiency. This is
3

because when a region attempts to attract capital from other regions by cutting tax rates,
it increases its own tax base relative to the national average, which simultaneously reduces
the region’s entitlement for higher grants. Consequently, the fiscal equalization system imposes incentives for regional governments to raise their tax rates.6 More recently, Büttner
(2006), Smart (2007) and Egger et al. (2010) examine the equalization system of Canada
and Germany and provide supporting evidence concerning the theoretical implications of the
incentive effect of fiscal equalization on regional governments’ tax policies.
Although there are a number of studies on how fiscal equalization schemes can correct
for the inefficient outcomes of tax competition, the literature on the potential role of fiscal
equalization in disciplining expenditure policies of regional governments is scarce. Assuming
homogeneity among all the competing regions, Hauptmeier (2009) and Breuillé et al. (2010)
investigate the effects of equalization transfers on the mix of local spending and conclude
that the systematic bias of public spending toward an over-provision of public input– as
pointed out in Keen and Marchand (1997)– is indeed alleviated via an equalization transfers
system. However, their framework does not allow them to explore how equalization transfers
may affect the asymmetric choice of expenditure policies across heterogeneous regions, which
is the main focus of this paper. More closely related to my analysis, Ivanyna (2010) analyzes
the role of fiscal transfers as an instrument in restraining the malevolent behavior of local
bureaucrats. He finds that when there is initial heterogeneity in productivity, subsidizing
private capital investments in poorly-endowed regions directly leads to increased levels of
public spending in all regions and to lower levels of corruption. However, the main focus
of Ivanya’s work differs from mine in one significant way. Ivanyna introduces a benevolent
social planner in the model, and then discusses the ideal design of fiscal transfers system so
that the malevolent behavior of local bureaucrats can be restrained in every region. Instead,
I directly introduce an equalization transfers scheme, similar to that used in many countries,
6

Hindriks et al. (2008) argue that the equalization system’s correction for inefficiency of tax competition
does not always hold in the presence of both tools of taxes and public investment. They show that equalization
is more likely to affect public investment choices but not equilibrium taxes because the marginal retention
rate of tax revenue decreases simultaneously with equalization which sets a disincentive for tax-raising efforts.
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into the inter-regional competition model and explore its potential impact on the asymmetric
expenditure policies chosen by heterogeneous regions from a positive perspective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model
based on C&T’s original setup, and derives testable empirical implications. Section 3 gives
a brief introduction of Germany’s state equalization system. Section 4 sets up the empirical
methodology and discusses the data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section
6 concludes.

2

The Model

2.1

Setup of the model

The basic structure of the model is based on C&T. I introduce a common form of an equalization transfer system to their original model and analyze its implications for the disciplining
effect of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions.
Consider an economy consisting of N + M regions, indexed by i. Of these regions, there
are only two types of regions which differ in their initial endowments.7 N denotes wellendowed regions, and M denotes poorly-endowed regions. Since initial endowments affect
the marginal productivity of capital locally invested, other things being equal, capital is
more productive in N than in M .
In each region a numeraire output is produced, and this output can either be used as
private consumption or government consumption. Specifically, the aggregate production
function is given by the standard Cobb-Douglas form

Fi (Ki , Ii ) = Ai Kiα Iiβ

7

(1)

Endowment refers to those factors that affect the productivity of a region, including stocks of natural
resources, human capital or infrastructure, etc.
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where α > 0, β > 0, α + β < 1 and Ai > 0,8 Ki is the amount of private capital invested
in region i and Ii is the amount of public input provided by the regional government that
enhances the productivity of private capital; Ai is the region-specific technology parameter
that reflects the effect of initial endowments on productivity. It is further assumed that
Ai = An represents the technology in well-endowed regions, Ai = Am the technology in
poorly-endowed regions, and so An > Am .
Since capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile across regions, the market clearing condition implies an allocation of capital across regions such that its net return in all regions is
equalized to the given economy-wide net return to capital (r), that is

(1 − t)

where

∂Fi
∂Ki

∂Fi
=r
∂Ki

(2)

denotes the marginal product of capital; t is the ad valorem tax rate on output

in region i and it is assumed to be fixed and coordinated by the central government for
all i.9 . With equation (1), I can solve (2) for the capital allocated in region i, to obtain
1

Ki = ( 1r (1 − t)αAi Iiβ ) 1−α . As indicated, capital flows to region i are determined by both
exogenous initial endowments (Ai ) and endogenous public input (Ii ).
The objective of each region is to maximize the utility of a representative household, and
this utility depends on the consumption of some combination of private goods and residential
public goods10
Ui = (1 − t)Fi + λgi

(3)

where (1 − t)Fi represents the disposable private goods and gi represents the residential
8

For analytical convenience, other fixed factors such as land or labor are normalized to unity and so not
included in the production function. The assumption that α + β < 1 , therefore, reflects this point.
9
This assumption presents the advantage of focusing exclusively on the strategic interactions of public input among regional governments. Indeed, in their extension analysis, C&T show that incorporating
endogenous tax rate competition is likely to strengthen the main results of the analysis.
10
Residential public goods refer to those public goods that are directly consumed by the residents in the
economy and do not enhance the productivity of private capital in any respect. As a matter of fact, equation
(3) can also be interpreted as the objective function of a partially self-interested government, in which case
gi stands for incumbent officials’ consumption of budget funds (C&T, p820).
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public goods provided by regional governments; λ > 0 measures household’s preference for
residential public goods relative to private goods. Regional governments use their output
tax revenues (tFi ) and transfers (Ti ) received from the central government to finance the
residential public good (gi ) and the public input provision (Ii ). The budget constraint of
each region is Ii + gi = tFi + Ti .11
Consider now the newly introduced transfer system. As noted in the introductory section,
the system I assume here is a common form of an equalization transfer system that distributes
funds to regions on the basis of the representative tax system (RTS) methodology. More
specifically, it sets the per capita transfer received or contributed for each region equal to
the difference between its capacity and the national average fiscal capacity, multiplied by
the national average effective tax rate. Algebraically, region i’s total transfers received or
contributed are given by
P
Fi Fi
Ti = υi t̄( Pi − )pi
pi
i pi
where pi is the population size in region i;
tax base;

Fi
pi

P
F
Pi i
i pi

(4)

represents the per capita national average

is region i’s per capita tax base; t̄ is the national average tax rate. Tax rates are

exogenously fixed across all regions, so t̄ = t. The term in brackets measures the deviation of
a region’s per capita tax base from the national average. A positive value indicates the region
has below-average fiscal capacity and, thus, is eligible for transfers. For negative values, the
region has to pay a contribution or negative transfer. The policy parameter, 0 6 υi 6 1,
in the equalization formula determines the extent to which the deviations of region i’s fiscal
capacity are equalized.12 Summing up, the budget constraint of region i can be rewritten as
P
Fi Fi
Ii + gi = tFi + υi t̄( Pi − )pi
pi
i pi
11

(5)

Note that Ti = 0 in C&T’s original model. I will show how this new element leads to a different
equilibrium in the latter part of this section.
12
Typically, the policy parameter υi would be the same for all regions. However, there are countries
that allow more equalization in certain economically disadvantaged regions. The pool of funds may also be
allocated in a manner not proportional with a constant υi but instead to fill the gap of the poorer regions
with priority.
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I examine a game in which all regional governments simultaneously choose the levels
of Ii , and then the investors make the decisions on where to invest. I then compare the
equilibriums for two cases: with and without the equalization scheme.

2.2

Equilibrium

The problem of each region’s government is to choose its public input (Ii ) independently so
as to maximize its objective function (3), subject to its budget constraint (5). The resulting
equilibrium of investments on public input and capital allocation are given as follows, while
the mathematical induction can be found in the Appendix A.
1−α
1
α
β 1−α α(1 − t) 1−α−β
)
Ai1−α−β τi1−α−β
Ii∗ = ( ) 1−α−β (
λ
r

(6)

β
1
1−α−β+αβ
β β α(1 − t) (1−α−β)(1−α)
Ki∗ = ( ) 1−α−β (
)
Ai1−α−β τi1−α−β
λ
r

(7)

1
1
where τi ≡ (1 − t + λt) 1−α
+ ( Ppipi − 1−α
)λυi t > 0, with the properties that
i

∂τi
∂υi

∂τi
< 0, ∂p
> 0.
i

Equation (6) immediately gives the following result.

Proposition 1. In equilibrium, a region’s investments on public input Ii∗ is increasing in
both Ai and τi .

Considering the relative investments on public input and capital allocation in both wellendowed and poorly-endowed regions by taking the ratios of their optimal public input levels
and capital received respectively.
1−α
1
In∗
An 1−α−β
τn 1−α−β
=
(
)
(
)
∗
Im
Am
τm

(8)

β
1
Kn∗
An 1−α−β
τn 1−α−β
=
(
)
(
)
∗
Km
Am
τm

(9)
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With these expressions of the equilibrium, I can analyze two cases:
(i) Equilibrium without equalization. In this case, I assume the absence of the equalization
system from the model, which by definition, reduces the model to the original C&T model.
Mathematically, this is equivalent to solving the current model in an extreme case that
υi = 0, which in turn gives the condition τn = τm . Equations (8) and (9) are then reduced
to

In∗
∗
Im

=

∗
Kn
∗
Km

1

= ( AAmn ) 1−α−β — the original equilibrium of C&T. Clearly, the greater is the

asymmetry in initial endowments

An
,
Am

optimal investments on public input

In∗
∗
Im

the larger is the gap of capital allocation

∗
Kn
∗
Km

and

between the two types of regions. Since the total

∗
= K̄, an increase of
stock of capital is fixed in the economy, i.e., N Kn∗ + M Km
∗
to an increase in Kn∗ and a decrease in Km
in order to ensure an increase of

∗
Kn
∗
Km

An
Am

must lead

. Meanwhile,

the decision rule for investments in public input in equation (15) reveals a strictly increasing
function of Ii (Ki , Ai ) in both Ki and Ai .13 This implies that the increase of

An
Am

will be

∗
. Thus, the heterogeneity of initial
converted to an increase in In∗ and a decrease in Im

endowments leads to the so called “one-sided” disciplining effect as described in C&T.
(ii) Equilibrium with equalization. In this case, the term,

τn
τm

6= 0, will be present on the

RHS of equations (8) and (9). It is, therefore, straightforward to expect that if an increase
of

An
Am

is offset by a decrease of

τn
,
τm

then the detected “one-sided” disciplining effect can be

corrected within the model. The following proposition characterizing the role of the equalization transfers can be stated.

Proposition 2. Other things being equal, as

τn
τm

decreases,

∗
Kn
∗
Km

and (so)

In∗
∗
Im

becomes smaller.

Since τi is a decreasing function of υi , and an increasing function of pi , this proposition
suggests that other things being equal, if (a) the equalization transfer scheme has the property
that the equalization degree in well-endowed regions is higher than the degree in poorlyendowed regions, i.e., υn > υm ; or (b) poorly-endowed regions are more populated regions
13

See Appendix for details.
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relative to well-endowed regions, i.e., pn < pm , then the divergent expenditure policies caused
by the heterogeneity of initial endowments can be corrected via the equalization system.14

2.3

Interpretation

The interpretation for the role of equalization system revealed by Proposition 2 can be
captured by the concept of the marginal tax rate of equalization system (MTRE). This
concept is defined as the fraction of one unit of additional tax revenue in a region that flows
out of the region due to the functioning of the system (Baretti et al., 2002).15
More formally, let us rewrite the budget constraint (5) in a way that total tax revenue
of region i can be grouped into a single term, Ii + gi = (1 + υi Ppipi − υi )tFi + υi t
i

pi

P
Fj
Pj6=i
.
p
i
i

Now consider that the region experiences one unit increase in total tax revenue tFi , due
to the mechanism of equalization transfer system, the total net gain of region i amounts to
(1+υi Ppipi −υi ). Thus, the fraction that flows out of the region, and so the marginal tax rate
i

of equalization system for region i is, M T REi = (1 −

Ppi )υi .16
i pi

It clearly indicates that a

larger υi or smaller pi leads to a higher MTRE in the region. Since υi captures the extent to
which the gap between the region’s own fiscal capacity and the national average is equalized,
it has a direct effect on the fraction that will flow out of the region. On the other hand,
a smaller population size pi implies a smaller share of total nationwide tax revenue in the
equalization system, which in turn means a larger outflow for the additional increment of tax
revenue. Therefore, the mechanism implied by Proposition 2 suggests a larger equalization
degree or a smaller population size in well-endowed regions is equivalent to a higher value of
MTRE in these regions. More generally, incorporating the MTRE to Propositions 1-2 gives
us the following implication for empirical tests.

14

As a matter of fact, even if well-endowed regions are more populated regions relative to poorly-endowed
regions, i.e., pn > pm , the equalization scheme with the feature that υn > υm can still be used to correct for
the divergent expenditure policies.
15
Note that under an equalization transfer system, a higher fiscal capacity will reduce the region’s transfers
from the equalization system or increase its contributions.
16
See Baretti et al. (2002) for a similar formula in calculating marginal tax rate of equalization transfers.
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Testable Implication 1.(i) In equilibrium, a region’s investments on public input Ii∗ is
increasing in initial endowments Ai , but decreasing in marginal tax rate of equalization
M T REi ; (ii) other things being equal, an increase of M T REi or a decrease of M T RE−i
(−i indexes the other type of regions rather than type i) will lead to a decrease of Ii∗ .

Intuitively, the MTRE captures the marginal tax rate on any additional tax revenues
that are produced by investments on public input. A higher level of MTRE in a region
implies a lower incentive for the region to expand the tax base by choosing higher level of
public input investment in order to obtain more equalization transfers or contribute less
equalization transfers. A higher level of MTRE in the competing regions, by contrast, would
reduce the extent of strategic response of these regions to the home region’s expenditure
policy, which results in an increase of investments on public input in the home region.
Although, as we have just seen, both the policy parameter υi and population size pi play
an important role in the determination of the MTRE, the latter factor is simply not a feasible
choice variable in the hands of the central government. From a policy perspective, it is indeed
the parameter υi that is controlled by the central government that fundamentally shapes the
role of the equalization system. Understanding this point and knowing the direction to
which this policy parameter affects the behaviors of regional governments is essential for a
better design of the equalization system. In particular, if the central government’s objective
is to achieve a more balancing outcome of regional expenditure policies on public input, it
would be necessary for the central government to impose a higher equalization degree υi ,
and so a higher MTRE in well-endowed regions than in its poorly-endowed counterparts.
Nevertheless, if the opposite is observed, then the initially divergent situation is more likely
to be strengthened as a result of the introduction of the equalization system. It should
therefore be the central government’s attention to ensure the emergence of the former case
by properly distributing the policy parameters υi in the design of the system, provided the
“one-sided” disciplining effect caused by endowment heterogeneity is a matter of concern for

11

the central government.

3

Equalization Transfers in Germany

Germany is a federation of sixteen states (Länder), ten of which are from the former Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the remaining five are from the former German
Democratic Republic (East Germany). The City of Berlin, which was formerly split between
East and West Germany but reunified in 1990, consists of the sixteenth state. The country’s
tax legislation is highly centralized and allocates virtually no direct autonomy to the states in
determining either the tax base or the tax rates. The main sources of revenue are generated
through corporate income, personal income and value added (VAT) taxes and are required by
law to be shared among the federal, state and local governments. While the detailed sharing
arrangement for VAT between the federal and state governments has changed frequently
since the fiscal reform (of West Germany) in 1969, the federal share of VAT has stabilized at
around 53%, leaving the state governments’ share at around 45% in recent years (Hepp and
von Hagen, 2012). The sharing of corporate income tax and personal income tax revenue
has been historically stable over the past three decades. The revenue from corporate income
tax is shared on a 50-50 basis between the federal and state governments, and 15% of the
revenue from personal income tax is allocated to municipalities while the rests are split
equally between the federal and state governments (each receiving 42.5%).
Since the revenue structure varies significantly across states, the revenue sharing system
involves considerable redistribution among states. Beyond this effort, the country operates
an extensive system of equalization transfers (länderfinanzausgleich, LFA) for the sixteen
states with an explicitly defined objective to assure “uniform living standards throughout
the territory of the federation”.17 The key elements of the system were introduced in the
fiscal reform (of West Germany) in 1969. It was initially designed for the ten West German
states (leaving out the former West-Berlin) until the five East German states and the new
17

Grundgesetz (German Constitution), Articles 72 and 106.
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united city of Berlin were integrated into the system in 1995. The LFA is based on article
107 of the German constitution and consists of a three-stage process. The first two stages are
largely characterized by horizontal redistribution between “rich” and “poor” states while the
last stage involves additional vertical grants from the federal government to “poor” states.
During the first stage (known as “VAT redistribution”), 25% of the state’s share of total
national VAT revenue is used for horizontal redistribution.18 That is, any state where the
fiscal capacity per capita19 is less than 92% of the national average receives VAT transfers
to bring it up to the level of 92% of the national average. If the total amount available for
the VAT redistribution is not large enough, the transfers are scaled back proportionally. In
contrast, if the total amount available is larger than what is needed, then the residuals are
again redistributed among all states according to the state’s population share.
During the second stage (known as “fiscal equalization among the states”), each state’s
relative status is determined by the ratio of the state’s fiscal capacity to its fiscal need.20
For those states having ratios greater than 100%, they contribute to the system; whereas
for those states whose ratios are less than 100%, they receive additional transfers from the
system. More specifically, for “receiving” states: if the ratio lies at the interval of (0%,
92%], then the gap between the ratio and 92% of the national average is fully closed by
transfers, and the remaining difference between 92% and the national average is subsidized
at 37.5%; if the original ratio lies at the interval of (92%, 100%], only 37.5% of the difference
between the ratio and the national average is subsidized. In the case of the “contributing”
states, the contribution rates follow a progressive schedule: if the ratio is in the interval of
(100%, 101%], 15% of the difference between the ratio and the national average must be
18

The remaining 75% of the state’s share of total national VAT revenues is reallocated among all states
according to the state’s population share (equal per capita basis), and so it does not involve equalization
function.
19
Fiscal capacity considered at this stage includes all pure state taxes plus a state’s share of corporate
income tax and personal income tax.
20
Fiscal capacity in this stage is calculated as the sum of state tax revenues, which includes the total
VAT revenues received in the first stage, and 50% of the tax revenues of its municipalities. Fiscal need is
simply the per capita average of all the states’ fiscal capacity multiplied by the state’s population. In order
to account for the special financial needs of the city-states, populations in Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg are
valued at 135% of their actual values.
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contributed; if the ratio belongs to the interval of (101%, 110%], an additional 66% of its
fiscal capacity above 101% of the national average is contributed; if the ratio is above 110%,
another 80% of the part lies above 110% of the national average is contributed. Finally, the
total contributions of the “contributing” states are raised or lowered by a factor to ensure
that total contributions equal to the total transfers received.
During the third stage (known as “supplementary federal grants”), two types of vertical
grants from the federal government are distributed. The first one (type I) provides additional
grants to fill 90% of any remaining gap between poorer states’ fiscal capacity and the national
average. The second type of supplementary grants (type II) are general purpose grants which
are paid to account for special needs such as special allocations to cover above-average
administration costs.21
Even though the size of the above LFA system expanded considerably in 1995 when East
German states and the new city state of Berlin entered the system (the so-called “Solidarity
Part I”), it has operated with virtually unchanged arrangements since 1969. A new arrangement came into effect from 2005 onwards and will last until 2019 (the so-called “Solidarity
Part II”). The new arrangements reformed numerous interconnected elements of the existing system, for example, replacing the current system of a replenishment rate of 100% by
a relative replenishment system in the VAT redistribution stage (LFA, stage 1); changing
the fiscal equalization among states (LFA, stage 2) from the graduated tariff to a steady
and linear tariff, etc.22 However, the basic structure and mechanisms of the system have
not been changed. As an example, Figure 1 illustrates the resulting main differences of the
second stage of the LFA system before and after 2005. The solid line captures the detailed
arrangements of the second stage of the LFA system before 2005. The dashed line describes
the new arrangements after (including) 2005. As shown, under the new system, if the ratio
of a state’s fiscal capacity to its fiscal need is less than 80%, the gap will be closed up to
21

Since these are beyond the interest of this paper, they will not be discussed any further in this paper.
For more information, see Brand (2006).
22
See Losco (2006) and Werner (2008) for further discussion on the new arrangements of the LFA system
in Germany after 2005.
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75%; after that, the compensation rate declines linearly to a value of 70% when the ratio
reaches 93%; finally, the compensation rate declines linearly again with a steeper slope to a
value of 44% when the ratio approaches 100%. A similar tiered system is also applied to the
“contributing states”, triggering different contribution rates depending on the states’ fiscal
capacity—less than 107%, between 107% and 120%, or greater than 120% of the fiscal need
(Bayern Staatsministerium der Finanzen, 2005).
Following the above detailed settings of the system, I calculate the marginal tax rate of
equalization for all the states in the period covered. Table 1 reports the average values of the
MTRE for each state,23 separated by different historical periods. As shown, the magnitudes
of the MTRE across states are determined by the two main factors, which I highlighted in
subsection 2.3–equalization degree υi and population size pi . Larger degree of equalization
or smaller population size results in larger MTRE. Since the German system imposes a
relatively higher degree of equalization for the “receiving” states than the “contributing”
states, it leads to the result that East German states, all of which are “receiving” states,
having, on average, a higher value of MTRE than West German states, a large part of which
are “contributing” states.24 However, the 2005 reform reversed this situation moderately by
reducing the MTRE in East German states while increasing the MTRE in some of West
German states in the “Solidarity Part II” period (see Table 1).

4

Empirical Methodology and Data

The model in section 2 predicts that regional heterogeneity of initial endowments leads to
divergent expenditure policies on public input, while a system of equalization can be effective
in correcting this distortion. In this section, I discuss the empirical strategy with the objective
23

The values reflect either the reduced amount that the “receiving” states would otherwise receive from
the system or the additional amount that the “contributing” states have to contribute, given a one unit
increase in its income tax revenue.
24
This situation raises a caution message that the German system may has been designed and implemented in the opposite direction as opposed to the desirable direction suggested by the theoretical model
for correcting the “one-sided” discipline effect.
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of testing these predictions that are explicitly summarized in Testable Implication 1, using a
panel dataset of sixteen German states from 1995 to 2007. As I outlined in the introduction,
one of the main reasons in supporting the selection of Germany as my case study is that I
aim to employ East and West German states as the classification of initially poorly- and wellendowed regions, which otherwise could be a quite challenging task.25 Since East German
states have only been fully integrated into the state fiscal equalization system since 1995, I
use year 1995 as the starting period in my analysis.

4.1
4.1.1

Specification
The baseline specification

In order to identify the prediction revealed in Testable Implication 1(i), I estimate the following baseline dynamic specification

Iit = ρIit−1 + λwesti + δmtreit−1 + Xit−1 β + ηi + ttt + εit

(10)

to explore the impacts of a state’s initial status of endowments and its MTRE on the state’s
expenditure on public input. In the specification, Iit is the dependent variable, which is
defined as the share of public input expenditure in total budgetary expenditure of state i in
year t. Iit−1 is a one-period (timely) lagged dependent variable, which is included to account
for the high degree of persistence in the government policies that is typically observed in the
data (e.g., Foucault et al., 2008; Kappeler and Välilä, 2008; Ghinamo et al., 2010; Klemm
and Van Parys, 2012). westi is a dummy variable for West German states, which takes the
value of 1 if state i belongs to West German states and 0 otherwise. This variable captures
25

In the theoretical model, I clearly defined initially poorly-endowed regions as those regions that have
lower output productivity, while initially well-endowed regions refer to those regions having higher output
productivity. Since the large productivity gap between East Germany and West Germany has been well
documented in the literature (e.g., Barrell and Te Velde, 2000; Burda and Hunt, 2001; Czarnitzki, 2005), my
classification should be viewed to make a lot of economic sense. For instance, the aggregate productivity
(measured by GDP per employee) in East Germany reached only 35% of the West Germany level in 1991
(Czarnitzki, 2005).
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my classification of initially well- and poorly-endowed regions. mtreit−1 is the marginal tax
rate of the equalization system of state i in year t − 1, which reflects the marginal tax
rate on any additional tax revenues produced by investments on public input. It is lagged
by one period to avoid the potential endogeneity issue of this variable. Furthermore, the
specification includes state fixed effects (ηi ) to control for unexplained heterogeneity across
states that are constant over time and also a linear time trend (ttt ).26
As control variables Xit−1 I seek to capture the general economic, fiscal, demographic,
and political factors of significance in determining public input expenditure. This leads to
the inclusion of real GDP per capita, openness, budget surplus, public debt, and population
density. Real GDP per capita serves as a measure of the income level, as higher incomes are
generally related to stronger demand for purely public services. Openness, which is calculated
as the ratio of total trades (import plus export) to GDP, aims to capture the exposure
of a state to trade and competition for capital. Following the studies by Mehrotra and
Välilä (2006) and Kappeler and Välilä (2008), the short- and long-term fiscal environment is
captured by the budget surplus of the state government and its public debt respectively. Both
are measured in relative to GDP and have been shown to be significant in the determination
of public investment in the literature. Population density serves as the needs for and cost of
public input networks that differ between densely and sparsely populated regions (Kappeler
and Välilä, 2008). I also include a set of political variables capturing the effects of elections
and political preferences. These include a dummy variable for an election year, which takes
the value 1 for each election year of the state and 0 otherwise; a dummy variable for partisan
affiliation, which takes the value 1 if the state government in power in that year belongs
to social-democratic party and 0 otherwise. Finally, all control variables are lagged by one
period to avoid any bias arising from the possible joint determination of these variables and
the dependent variable.

26

The inclusion of state fixed effects also helps dealing with endogeneity that may arise from time invariant
omitted variables.
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4.1.2

Regional interactions

Testable Implication 1(ii) reveals that a state’s expenditure on public input reacts positively
to its competing states’ MTRE. This correlation is obtained under the regional competition
framework, which, by its nature, implies another positively strategic interaction between a
state’s public input expenditure and its competing states’ public input expenditure. Thus,
these properties result in the inclusion of the spatially lagged dependent variable and the
spatially lagged of MTRE in the competing states to specification (10), which is also known
as a dynamic spatial lag specification in the most general form of

Iit = ρIit−1 +

X

θij Ijt + λwesti + δmtreit−1 +

j6=i

X

ψij mtrejt−1 + Xit−1 β + ηi + ttt + εit (11)

j6=i

where j denotes all the competing states of state i. Since the focus is on the competition
between the two types of states with heterogeneity in initial endowments, j represents the
opposite type of state of state i. More specifically, if state i belongs to initially poorlyendowed states (i.e., East German states), then state j represents all initially well-endowed
states (i.e., West German states); vice versus. However, this model cannot be estimated as
it stands, as there are too many parameters (θij and ψij ) to be estimated. The usual method
adopted in spatial econometrics to address this issue is to estimate the following

Iit = ρIit−1 + θI−it + λwesti + δmtreit−1 + ψmtre−it−1 + Xit−1 β + ηi + ttt + εit

(12)

where I−it and mtre−it−1 are the weighted average of state j’s public input expenditure and
MTRE respectively, i.e.


 I−it = P wij Ijt
j6=i
P
 mtre

−it−1 =
j6=i wij mtrejt−1
and wij are exogenously chosen weights, normalized so that
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(13)

P

j6=i

wij = 1.

An important decision concerns the choice of the weights. As emphasized above, the
spatial interaction in this analysis is between initially poorly- and well-endowed states, which
renders the use of geographic criteria in creating the weighting matrices infeasible.27 Instead,
I consider the following three possible weighting schemes that are proposed by Devereux et al.
(2008). The first one (denoted as “weight I”), which serves as a benchmark, is very simple;
weights are assumed to be uniform, i.e. wij =

1
,
nj

where nj is the number of states classified

as state j.28 An alternative weighing scheme (denoted as “weight II”) takes into account the
relative wealth level of each state j. The typical element of the weights is, wij =

yjt
P nj
j=1

yjt

,

where yjt denotes real GDP per capita of state j in year t. A final weighing scheme (denoted
as “weight III”) is intended to capture the relative extent of competition of each state j.
The typical element of the weights is, wij =

ejt
Pnj

j=1 ejt

, where ejt denotes openness of state j

in year t. These latter two methods present a better approximation of the relative wealth
levels and exposure to competition of the two types of regions involved in the competition,
and serve as good candidates for robustness checks. It should be noted that I also relax the
restriction that the competition is only conducted among initially poorly- and well-endowed
states in order to examine the spatial interactions among all the states. This analysis and
the associated results are discussed in detail later.

27

In the standard practice of the spatial econometrics literature, a common assumption is the geographically close jurisdictions interact more strongly. This leads to the use of two common methods in defining
the weights. The first one is based on a contiguity matrix, where the value 1 is assigned if two jurisdictions
share the same border and 0 otherwise. An alternative is to use the inverse distances of two jurisdictions
as weights (e.g., Foucault et al., 2008; Ghinamo et al., 2010; Jacobs et al., 2010; Klemm and Van Parys,
2012). Since the neighbors of a state may not be in the opposite type of this state at the same time, so the
contiguity method may not coincide with my primary objective to explore the competition among initially
poorly- and well-endowed states. Similarly, the inverse distance method is not employed due to the fact that
geographically closer states of a state may be those states of the same type of this state, which again does
not identify my theoretical question. However, these two methods are employed later in this study to test
the robustness of the results by relaxing the assumption that the competition is only conducted among two
types of regions.
28
More specifically, if state j is initially well-endowed states (i.e., West German states), then nj equals
ten, which is the ten West German states; if state j is initially poorly-endowed states (i.e., East German
states), then nj equals 6, which is the five East German states plus the new united city of Berlin.
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4.2

Estimation

In order to estimate specifications (10) and (12) unbiasedly and efficiently, two critical endogeneity issues have to be addressed. First, in all these specifications, the lagged dependent
variable is endogenous since it is correlated with the state fixed effects in the composite error
term (ηi + εit ), which yields biased and inconsistent results if OLS or fixed effect estimators
are applied (Nickell, 1981). Second, specification (12) shows that expenditure policies of
the competitors enter contemporaneously, so that the competitors’ expenditure decisions are
endogenous and correlated with the error term (εit ). OLS yields a biased estimate of parameter ρ (Anselin, 1988).29 Beyond the endogeneity issues, another important concern is the
estimation of the time-invariant variable westi in all the specifications. It is well known that
dealing with the state fixed effects by the fixed effect estimator or first difference method
will wipe out this time-invariant variable, which is one of the key variables in this study.
To circumvent all these problems, I employ the system GMM estimator developed by
Blundell and Bond (1998), that has been used quite often in the recent studies on tax
competition with dynamic features (Foucault et al., 2008; Ghinamo et al., 2010; Klemm
and Van Parys, 2012). This estimator combines the moment conditions from both the
first-differenced equation of the estimating equation and the estimating equation in levels,
and then estimates the parameters by GMM.30 In addition, following the standard spatial
econometrics literature (Kelejian and Robinson, 1993; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998), I also use
the competitors’ weighted average of explanatory variables, including weighted real GDP
per capita, weighted openness, weighted budget surplus, weighted public debt, and weighted
population density, as extra exogenous instruments for the spatial lag variable (I−it ) in

29

This second endogeneity is a typical issue in the spatial econometrics literature. Two conventional
approaches for getting consistent estimates of the spatial parameter are suggested in the literature. The
first approach is to use instrumental variables (Anselin, 1988). An alternative approach is to rely on the
maximum likelihood (See Brueckner, 2003, for more discussion). Although both approaches yield consistent
estimate of spatial parameter, the latter method is generally challenging in computation.
30
In dealing with the endogenous variables, the system GMM estimator uses lagged levels to instrument
the endogenous differences and lagged first differences to instrument levels.
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specification (12).31 Regarding the time-invariant variable westi , although it sweeps out in
the first-differenced equation, the levels equation still allows for identification of this variable
since all instruments for the level equation are assumed to be orthogonal to state fixed effects
(Roodman, 2009a).
The overall validity of the instruments used in the regressions as well as the serial correlation in the residuals are evaluated by the Hansen test (or overidentifying restriction test) and
the Arellano and Bond (1991) test respectively. The former statistic tests the null hypothesis
that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals, while the latter tests the presence
of auto-correlation in the residuals.32 Both statistics are necessary to confirm the validity
of the instruments used. Finally, given my small sample size and a significant amount of
additional instruments introduced, I restrict the lags to three and four years and collapse
the instrument matrix when estimating specification (12) in order to avoid the problem of
too many instruments as discussed in Roodman (2009a,b).
Ideally, one would also include time dummies in the specifications to prevent the most
likely form of cross-state correlation, contemporaneous correlation. However, it generates
two problems in my context. Due to the large amount of instruments created by the system
GMM estimator together with the external instruments, adding time dummies may weaken
the Hansen test and overfit the endogenous variable (Roodman, 2009a,b). Additionally,
Devereux et al. (2008) and Klemm and Van Parys (2012) point out that the inclusion of time
dummies in a model with spatial lag variables results in a possible multicollinearity issue
among the spatial lag variables and the time dummies,33 which makes it hard to identify the
true impact of each variable. Therefore, following the suggestion by Devereux et al. (2008)
and Klemm and Van Parys (2012), I add a linear time trend variable that captures common
trend for all states, instead of using time dummies.
31

The weights are constructed in the same way as the ones I discussed previously.
Given the structure of the first-differences equation in the system GMM estimator, the first order
correlation in the residuals is usually expected, but the second order correlation in the residuals should be
avoided for a valid specification.
33
The reason here is that the inclusion of time dummies is equivalent to adding the average value of the
dependent variable in each year, which by its nature is highly correlated with the spatial lag variables.
32
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4.3

Data

The panel dataset covers sixteen German states over the period 1995-2007. In this subsection,
I explain the dataset in further detail, with a special focus on the measurements of the
composition of public input expenditure and the MTRE.
To begin with, Iit is defined as the sum of state i’s government expenditure on productive
items in year t as percentage of the state’s total budgetary expenditure. Since the functional
classification of productive items turns out to be quite controversial in the literature, in this
study, I follow the classification method defined by Thöne (2005), and recently employed
by Hauptmeier (2009) in the German context. In Thöne’s original study, he conducted an
in-depth survey on the productivity effects of different government expenditure categories
in the empirical literature, and then applied the resulting insights to the German system of
budgetary accounting to generate a meaningful indicator for each of the expenditure categories. More specifically, the following two main expenditure categories are identified as
productive expenditure based on his study: public infrastructure; and education, research
and development (R&D). The first category includes expenditures on streets, waterways
and ports, rail and public transport, aviation, and municipal services. The latter includes
expenditures on schools and pre-school education, sponsorship of pupils, students, etc., universities, and research and development (outside universities). In general, expenditures on
public infrastructure have the most direct economic impacts by reducing firms’ production
and transaction costs, while the economic impacts of expenditures on education and R&D
are more long-term as it facilitates the build-up and maintenance of human capital in the
economy (Kappeler and Välilä, 2008). Data on the detailed expenditure items are obtained
from the German Federal Statistical Office. Figure 2 provides an overview of the evolution
of public input expenditure in Germany over the time period covered. It shows averages for
the measure of public input expenditure, classified by the whole country, East Germany and
West Germany. The figure reveals a persistent tendency of higher expenditures on public
input in West Germany than in East Germany, which tentatively sheds some light on C&T’s
22

original hypothesis that initially well-endowed regions tend to spend more on public input
than initially poorly-endowed regions.
The key variable of interest, MTRE, is simulated from a more complicated process since it
is not directly observable. Note that the concept of MTRE is broadly defined as the fraction
of one additional unit of own source revenue that flows out of the region in responding to
the equalization mechanism. The fraction for each state in a particular year depends on the
state’s fiscal capacity in relative to its fiscal need, and the resulting equalization parameter
it faces corresponds to the system arrangement specified in section 3. Given the German’s
equalization system is a three-stage procedure with varied definitions of fiscal capacity and
equalized parameters in each stage, I resort to the simulation method to calculate the MTRE
for each state in each year, based on a rich set of information. More specifically, I utilize
a state’s relevant tax revenue and population data defined in each of the three equalization
stages to determine the particular equalization formula it should face, and then calculate
the resulting changes of equalization payments for a hypothesized one unit increase in tax
revenue. The overall MTRE for a state is obtained by adding the resulting changes of equalization payments in all the three stages, adjusted by the changing values of the hypothesized
increase of own source tax revenue in different stages. A brief description of this simulation process can be found in the Appendix. Very detailed data on calculating a state’s
fiscal capacity and fiscal need in all three stages are obtained from the annual enactments
(1995-2007) to implement the fiscal equalization law.
Data for all other variables are derived from the German Federal Statistical Office, with
the exception of information on election year and partisan affiliation, which in turn are
collected from the website http://www.election.de/. Summary statistics of all the variables
are given in Table 2.
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5

Results

5.1

Main results

All specifications are estimated by the system GMM method explained above, along with
robust and finite sample corrected standard errors. The Hansen test and the Arellano and
Bond (1991) test are reported at the bottom of each table, indicating the validity of the
instruments used. Given the fact that the German equalization system changed slightly in
2005, I present the estimation results for the time period 1995-2004 as main results for the
analysis, and later report the results from a longer period as robustness checks.
Column (1) in Table 3 reports the estimation results of the baseline specification (10)
assuming no regional interactions. I find a positive and significant coefficient of the measurement of heterogeneous regions (westi ) in line with C&T’s original hypothesis that initially
well-endowed regions (i.e., West German states) tend to spend higher proportion on public
input expenditure than their poorly-endowed counterparts (i.e., East German states). A
negative and significant estimate of the MTRE implies that higher marginal tax rate on any
potential increments of tax revenues produced by investments on public input cuts a state’s
expenditures on public input, supporting Testable Implication 1 (i). Turning to the effects of
regional interactions, I present the estimation results of specification (12) in columns (2), (3),
and (4) of Table 3 with alternative definitions of weighting matrices described in the previous
section. Similarly, results are strongly in line with the theoretical predictions described in
Testable Implication 1(ii)–the competing states’ MTRE positively and significantly affects
the home state’s public input expenditure.
Considering the magnitudes of the effects, West German states spend roughly 3 to 4
percentage points more on public input expenditure than East German states. A one percentage point increase in the MTRE will reduce the proportion of public input expenditure
by about 0.09 percentage points in the estimation without considering regional interactions,
and by about 0.05 percentage points when controlling regional interactions. As summarized

24

in Table 1, most states have a value of MTRE around or above 80%. This implies that,
other things being equal, if the MTRE is reduced to zero, state public input expenditure
will be increased on average by about 14%.34 The effect from the competing states’ MTRE
turns out to be relatively much stronger, it has an estimated coefficient amounts to roughly
five times as large as the home state’s MTRE, suggesting that spatial interactions play an
important role in the determination of the home state’s expenditure policy. Nevertheless,
this relatively large magnitude of the effect from the competing states needs to be interpreted
with caution, since it clearly, as I will show in more details later, depends on the methods I
adopt to define the weighing schemes.
As far as the control variables are concerned, the lagged dependent variable has a positive
and significant coefficient, indicating high persistence of the expenditure policies. A positive
and significant effect from the competitors’ weighted public input expenditure provides evidence on the existence of strategic interaction among states’ public input expenditure which
in turn is the fundamental assumption of this study. Real GDP per capita is negative and
significant in all four models, suggesting that a state with higher income level in the past period may care more about people’s well-being, and so spend more on welfare expenditures.35
Openness has positive but not significant effect. While the short-term fiscal position, measured by the budget surplus, has negative but mostly insignificant effect, higher public debt
capturing the effect of long-term fiscal position significantly reduces investments on public
input. As expected, densely populated states tend to spend higher proportion of expenditures on productive items, though the estimates are only statistically significant at the
margin. This indicates a higher demand of public input networks in these states. Moreover,
the results also show that states have a tendency to spend more on productive expenditure
34

I assume the estimated coefficient of MTRE taking a value of 0.05; and note that the mean value of
public input expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure for all states amounts to 29.4% (see Table 2).
35
One may argue that real GDP per capita is highly correlated with the measurement of heterogeneous
region. But I believe that the former mostly captures the wealth level of the state in current period, while
the latter captures a greater difference in many aspects of the two types of regions at the beginning period.
As a matter of fact, dropping real GDP per capita from the regressions does not affect my main results.
These results are not reported in the paper, but they are available upon requested.
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during election periods,36 though partisan affiliation does not reflect significantly different
preferences over the composition of public expenditure.

5.2

Sensitivity analysis

In order to test for the robustness of the main results, I conduct sensitivity analysis along
two dimensions. First, I re-estimate the specifications based on a longer time period covering
1995 to 2007, which includes additional observations from the new settings of the equalization system. It is expected that the results should be largely consistent with the main results,
as the basic structure and mechanism of the system have not been changed. Second, I utilize
alternative definitions of the weighting matrices to estimate specification (12). The rationale
here is that the results I obtained so far have been derived under specific assumptions with
respect to the weighting matrices. More specifically, the above three weighting schemes are
constructed in a way that fits the theoretical assumption regarding the competition among
two types of regions. This specific construction certainly has its own benefits in exactly
identifying the theoretical question but, in a broader sense and as in related studies, the implications of the model may also be applied to any types of the competing states. It therefore
seems to be warranted to relax this assumption in constructing the weighing schemes. To
do so, I follow the existing literature to reconstruct the above three weighting schemes (i.e.,
weight I, weight II, and weight III) by disregarding their types of initial endowments. That
is, instead of defining the competing states of state i as its opposite type of states, I simply
use all the states except state i itself. I denote these three additional weighting schemes
as weight IV, weight V, and weight VI, respectively. In addition, I also follow most of the
spatial econometrics literature to construct two more weighting matrices, which accounts for
both the geographic closeness between states and the differences in the states’ size. More
specifically, the typical elements for these two weights (denoted as “weight VII” and “weight
VIII”) are, wij =
36

cij popjt
P

j6=i cij popjt

and wij =

P

dij popjt
,
dij popjt

j6=i

where cij is a border dummy which

These estimates are in general statistically significant in a one-tail test at the 10% level.
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equals one when state i and j share a common border and zero otherwise (with cii = 0); dij
is the inverse distance between state i and j (with dii = 0); and popjt denotes population
size of state j in year t.
Tables 4 reports results obtained from estimations with data from 1995 to 2007. As expected, the inclusion of more information gives qualitatively similar results to those obtained
before; and with more observations, the estimates for some control variables including budget surplus, population density, and election become statistically more significant. However,
as noted earlier, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for competing states’ MTRE
are reduced by roughly a half in two out of the three cases (see columns (2) and (3) in
Table 4), even though the magnitudes for the measurement of heterogeneous regions and
the home state’s MTRE remain relatively comparable. Table 5 documents the results obtained with alternative weighting schemes. In all cases, the results are consistent with the
main ones, which provide further robust evidence on the role of initial endowments and the
equalization system in affecting the state’s expenditure policy. Similarly, these results also
repeat the caution message that the magnitude effect of the equalization system, especially
for the competing states’ MTRE, has to be interpreted carefully, as it varies across different
definitions of the weighting matrices.37

6

Conclusion

The paper explores the potential role of an equalization transfer system in correcting the distortion of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions in initial endowments. This
distortion has been particularly claimed by C&T, arguing that competition among these
heterogeneous regions leads to a “one-sided” disciplining effect on regional governments’
expenditure policies: only well-endowed regions end up with more productive expenditure
policies, while poorly-endowed counterparts do the opposite. I add a conventional equal37

As shown in Table 5, the estimated coefficient of MTRE ranges from -0.127 to -0.064, while the corresponding value for the competing states’ MTRE ranges from 0.07 to 0.285.
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ization system to C&T’s original model and show how this “one-sided” disciplining effect
can be corrected by the system with desired parameter settings. In particular, it requires
the central government to set a relatively higher equalization degree for the well-endowed
regions, which at the end converts to generate a larger disincentive effect for the governments
in these regions to expand their tax base by choosing higher level of public input expenditure.
The basic predictions of the model are tested by the German equalization system, which
closely matches the model assumptions and identification needs. Apart from the finding
confirming the emergence of “one-sided” disciplining effect among West and East German
states, my estimations validate the prediction that the equalization system exerts a significant
role in affecting the states’ expenditure behaviors–a result that can be utilized by the central
government for its design of an effective equalization system to tackle the regional divergent
expenditure policies driven by the regional heterogeneity of initial endowments.
These findings have significant policy relevance. As decentralization has been widely
implemented in many countries around the world, where heterogeneity in natural resources,
human capital, or infrastructure are largely observed across different regions, there will be a
need for rethinking some corrective policies from the central government that can remedy the
“one-sided” disciplining effect in order to avoid an even worse outcome of regional disparity.
In this particular context, there are many reasons why an equalization system might be
favored. Beyond the most usual argument in supporting this system to reduce regional
disparities in fiscal capacity and the additional reasoning in favoring its role in internalizing
the externality of tax competition as found in some recent literature, I supplement this
support by highlighting its role in balancing regional expenditure policies and so contributing
to long-run balanced regional development. In all, I present a different point of view to
that of C&T in the sense that, I believe decentralization may also be able to achieve the
goal of imposing discipline on local governments in heterogeneous countries, where a welldesigned fiscal equalization system shall play an essential role for the success of the countries’
decentralization policy.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium Solution of the Model
The problem of region i is to choose the level of Ii independently so as to maximize its
objective function (3), subject to its budget constraint (5). The first order condition (FOC)
gives
pi
(1 − t + λt + λυi t P
i

pi

− λυi t)(

∂Fi ∂Ki ∂Fi
pi X ∂Fj ∂Kj
+
) + λυi t P
=λ
∂Ki ∂Ii
∂Ii
i pi j6=i ∂Kj ∂Ii

(14)

Given market clearing condition (2) and total stock of capital in the economy is fixed
P ∂Kj
∂Ki
∂Fi
r
i Ki = K̄ , it is straightforward to find that ∂Ki = 1−t , for all i and ∂Ii = −
j6=i ∂Ii . Sub1
stituting these two conditions, along with the capital allocation rule Ki = ( 1r (1−t)αAi Iiβ ) 1−α
and the aggregate production function (1) into equation (14), I derive the decision rule for
investments in public input as

P

1
1
Ii = ( βAi Kiα τi ) 1−β
λ

(15)
1

Thereby, the capital allocation rule Ki = ( 1r (1 − t)αAi Iiβ ) 1−α and the public input decision rule (15) jointly characterize the equilibrium of the model. The solution to these two
equations system is presented in equations (6) and (7).

Appendix B: Simulation of the MTRE in Germany
In this appendix, I provide a brief description of the simulation method I employed to
calculate the MTRE for each state covering the period 1995-2007. My method is similar to
those of Baretti et al. (2002), Hauptmeier (2009), and Büttner et al. (2011), but with a novel
distinction that I include the case of the new system arrangements which took effective from
2005 onward.38
The essence of the calculation is to identify the fraction of a one unit additional tax
revenue in a state that flows out of the state due to the functioning of the equalization
system. Given the German’s equalization system is a three-stage procedure with varied
equalization rules and definitions of fiscal capacity in each stage, this simulation of the
MTRE can only be achieved by calculating the marginal change of the state’s transfers from
(or its contributions to) the equalization system stage by stage, and then adding up all the
resulting information. More specifically, let us denote tsi and nsi as state i’s fiscal capacity
and fiscal need in stage s (s = 1, 2, 3) of the LFA system respectively.39 Following the federal
38
39

A more detailed discussion on the simulation is available upon request from the author.
All notations represent values in one particular year. Note that tax revenues that are considered as

33

ts

fiscal equalization rules specified in section 3 and depending on the value of nis , I determine
i
the particular equalization formula that the state should face to calculate its transfers from
ts
(or its contributions to) the equalization system, i.e. Gsi = f ( nis ). The marginal effect of an
i
increase of fiscal capacity in state i for stage s is then given by the first derivative of Gsi with
∂Gs
respect to tsi , i.e. ∂tsi .
i
Finally, in order to calculate the overall MTRE of a state in a particular year, I consider
the experiment that personal income tax revenue increases by one unit. Due to the tax
sharing mechanism I described in section 3, 42.5% of personal income tax revenue accrues
to the federal government, while the rests are allocated between state and municipality
governments at a rate of 42.5% and 15% respectively. Thus the MTRE is at least 0.425
for the portion goes to the federal government. Then the LFA system comes into effect for
the rest 0.575 unit increment of income tax: since during stage 1 only pure state taxes and
a state’s share of corporate income tax and personal income tax are taken into account as
∂G1
fiscal capacity, so stage 1 increases the MTRE by 0.425| ∂t1i |; during stage 2, 50% of the tax
i
revenues of its municipalities is also included in the calculation of fiscal capacity, so stage 2
∂G1
∂G2
increases the MTRE by (0.425 ∗ (1 − | ∂t1i |) + 0.15 ∗ 0.5) ∗ | ∂t2i |; lastly, stage 3 increases the
∂G1
| ∂t1i |)
i

i

MTRE by (0.425 ∗ (1 −
+ 0.15 ∗ 0.5) ∗ (1 −
for each state can be presented as follows

∂G2
| ∂t2i |)
i

i

∗

∂G3
| ∂t3i |.
i

In sum, the overall MTRE

∂G1i
∂G2i
∂G1i
|
+
(0.425
∗
(1
−
|
|)
+
0.15
∗
0.5)
∗
|
|
∂t1i
∂t1i
∂t2i
∂G1i
∂G2i
∂G3i
+(0.425 ∗ (1 − | 1 |) + 0.15 ∗ 0.5) ∗ (1 − | 2 |) ∗ | 3 |.
∂ti
∂ti
∂ti

M T RE = 0.425 + 0.425|

states’ fiscal capacity vary across different stages of the LFA system. The state’s corresponding fiscal need
in stage s, nsi , is simply the per capita average of all the states’ fiscal capacity in that stage multiplied by
the state’s population.

34

Compensation rate (%)

100

80
75
70
66

75
70

44
37.5
15
80

92 93
100 101
107 110
The ratio of fiscal capacity to fiscal need (%)
Source: Bayern Staatsministerium der Finanzen (2005)

120

Figure 1. Marginal rates of compensation/contribution before and after 2005 in the second
stage of the LFA
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Figure 2. Average of expenditure on public input over the years
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Table 1: Average Value of Marginal Tax Rate of Equalization in Germany
States

Overall
(1995-2007)

Solidarity Part I
(1995-2004)

Solidarity Part II
(2005-2007)

East Germany
Berlin
Brandenburg
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Sachsen
Sachsen-Anhalt
Thüringen

0.908
0.923
0.923
0.922
0.923
0.923

0.912
0.925
0.925
0.924
0.925
0.925

0.893
0.917
0.918
0.916
0.917
0.917

West Germany
Baden-Württemberg
Bayern
Bremen
Hamburg
Hessen
Niedersachsen
Nordrhein-Westfalen
Rheinland-Pfalz
Saarland
Schleswig-Holstein

0.756
0.752
0.893
0.776
0.791
0.896
0.753
0.894
0.923
0.890

0.759
0.757
0.921
0.776
0.797
0.894
0.736
0.888
0.925
0.883

0.745
0.737
0.797
0.777
0.773
0.905
0.810
0.913
0.918
0.913

Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: The simulation is conducted by assuming a one unit increase in income tax revenue.

Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable
Share of public input expenditure (Iit )
West
MTRE
GDP per capita, log
Openness
Budget surplus (% of GDP)
Public debt (% of GDP)
Population density, log
Election
Party affiliation

Mean
0.294
0.625
0.865
10.132
0.437
-0.013
0.299
5.745
0.212
0.505

Source: Author’s calculations.
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Std. Dev. Min. Max.
0.041
0.212 0.386
0.485
0
1
0.074
0.690 0.925
0.272
9.686 10.758
0.233
0.079 1.032
0.015
-0.072 0.056
0.121
0.087 0.724
1.112
4.283 8.268
0.409
0
1
0.501
0
1

Obs.
208
208
208
208
208
208
208
208
208
208

Table 3: Estimation results for the effects of initial endowment and the equalization system
Dependent variable: Iit

(1)

(2)
(3)
Weight I Weight II
Iit−1
0.334*** 0.530*** 0.568***
(2.98)
(4.92)
(5.89)
I−it
0.969*** 0.858***
(4.14)
(4.03)
West
0.037***
0.038**
0.026*
(3.98)
(2.54)
(1.87)
M T REit−1
-0.087**
-0.055*
-0.049*
(-2.52)
(-1.95)
(-1.76)
M T RE−it−1
0.245*** 0.271***
(3.47)
(3.55)
GDP per capita t − 1
-0.091*** -0.069*** -0.065***
(-4.00)
(-4.17)
(-4.16)
Openness t − 1
0.016
0.014
0.017
(0.71)
(0.77)
(1.04)
Budget surplus t − 1
-0.236**
-0.113
-0.143
(-2.22)
(-1.00)
(-1.30)
Public debt t − 1
-0.169*** -0.126*** -0.122***
(-5.12)
(-4.43)
(-4.63)
Population density t − 1
0.003
0.003
0.003
(1.16)
(1.33)
(1.31)
Election t − 1
0.001
0.002
0.002
(0.82)
(1.52)
(1.39)
Party affiliation t − 1
-0.004
-0.004
-0.003
(-0.76)
(-0.87)
(-0.85)
Constant
1.189***
0.363*
0.330*
(4.92)
(1.7)
(1.71)
State fixed effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Time trend
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
144
144
144
Number of states
16
16
16
Hansen test (p-value)
0.346
0.98
0.883
AR(1) (p-value)
0.008
0.002
0.003
AR(2) (p-value)
0.688
0.788
0.871

(4)
Weight III
0.563***
(5.48)
1.109***
(4.46)
0.030*
(1.81)
-0.048*
(-1.81)
0.286***
(2.64)
-0.066***
(-4.22)
0.017
(1.01)
-0.162
(-1.55)
-0.125***
(-4.69)
0.003
(1.38)
0.003
(1.45)
-0.003
(-0.83)
0.254
(1.17)
Yes
Yes
144
16
0.924
0.002
0.742

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1995-2004. Models are estimated by system GMM estimator. I−it and M T RE−it−1 are the weighted averages of
values of the competing states (the opposite type of states)’ public input expenditures
and marginal tax rate of equalization respectively. I−it is instrumented by weighted
real GDP per capita, weighted openness, weighted budget surplus, weighted public
debt, and weighted population density. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented by higher-order lags (restricted to t − 3 to t − 4) of the dependent variable.
The remaining explanatory variables are considered to be exogenous and therefore
also included in the instrument matrix. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Sensitivity checks: estimation results with alternative time period
Dependent variable: Iit

(1)

(2)
(3)
Weight I Weight II
Iit−1
0.388*** 0.546*** 0.611***
(2.90)
(4.56)
(4.34)
I−it
1.076*** 0.951***
(4.37)
(3.98)
West
0.034*** 0.051*** 0.041***
(3.52)
(3.12)
(2.60)
M T REit−1
-0.093*** -0.059**
-0.048*
(-3.56)
(-2.24)
(-1.87)
M T RE−it−1
0.145**
0.126**
(2.13)
(2.10)
GDP per capita t − 1
-0.096*** -0.077*** -0.068***
(-4.23)
(-5.27)
(-4.17)
Openness t − 1
0.005
0.008
0.01
(0.27)
(0.45)
(0.65)
Budget surplus t − 1
-0.149*
-0.073
-0.092
(-1.82)
(-0.74)
(-0.96)
Public debt t − 1
-0.162*** -0.136*** -0.123***
(-3.86)
(-4.82)
(-3.70)
Population density t − 1 0.007**
0.006*** 0.005***
(2.42)
(3.14)
(2.72)
Election t − 1
0.002**
0.003**
0.003**
(2.08)
(2.44)
(2.19)
Party affiliation t − 1
-0.002
-0.0003
0.0005
(-0.44)
(-0.08)
-0.17
Constant
1.212*** 0.483***
0.423**
(4.75)
(2.67)
(2.43)
State fixed effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Time trend
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
192
192
192
Number of states
16
16
16
Hansen test (p-value)
0.935
1.000
0.999
AR(1) (p-value)
0.005
0.002
0.002
AR(2) (p-value)
0.636
0.289
0.457

(4)
Weight III
0.538***
(4.17)
1.224***
(4.99)
0.037**
(2.16)
-0.064***
(-2.66)
0.295**
(2.21)
-0.081***
(-4.66)
0.009
(0.52)
-0.152*
(-1.73)
-0.138***
(-4.14)
0.006***
(3.19)
0.003**
(2.13)
-0.001
(-0.22)
0.363*
(1.84)
Yes
Yes
192
16
0.985
0.002
0.212

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1995-2007. Models are estimated by system GMM estimator. I−it and M T RE−it−1 are the weighted averages of
values of the competing states (the opposite type of states)’ public input expenditures
and marginal tax rate of equalization respectively. I−it is instrumented by weighted
real GDP per capita, weighted openness, weighted budget surplus, weighted public
debt, and weighted population density. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented by higher-order lags (restricted to t − 3 to t − 4) of the dependent variable.
The remaining explanatory variables are considered to be exogenous and therefore
also included in the instrument matrix. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and
10% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Sensitivity checks: estimation results with alternative weighting schemes
Dependent variable: Iit

(1)
Weight IV
Iit−1
0.478***
(2.74)
I−it
0.875***
(3.93)
West
0.031**
(2.32)
M T REit−1
-0.064†
(-1.51)
M T RE−it−1
0.285***
(2.61)
GDP per capita t − 1
-0.082***
(-3.24)
Openness t − 1
0.017
(0.86)
Budget surplus t − 1
-0.151
(-1.13)
Public debt t − 1
-0.142***
(-4.19)
Population density t − 1
0.003
(1.01)
Election t − 1
0.002
(1.08)
Party affiliation t − 1
-0.004
(-0.51)
Constant
0.523
(1.42)
State fixed effect
Yes
Time trend
Yes
Observations
144
Number of states
16
Hansen test (p-value)
0.99
AR(1) (p-value)
0.022
AR(2) (p-value)
0.777

(2)
Weight V
0.369*
(1.88)
0.834***
(3.83)
0.040***
(2.63)
-0.091*
(-1.80)
0.183*
(1.90)
-0.094***
(-3.30)
0.014
(0.60)
-0.180
(-1.22)
-0.150***
(-3.59)
0.003
(0.83)
0.001
(0.96)
-0.009
(-0.89)
0.803**
(2.13)
Yes
Yes
144
16
0.986
0.035
0.643

(3)
Weight VI
0.451***
(2.59)
0.757**
(2.39)
0.036***
(2.64)
-0.074*
(-1.77)
0.236*
(1.83)
-0.087***
(-3.34)
0.012
(0.51)
-0.216*
(-1.90)
-0.144***
(-3.10)
0.003
(1.04)
0.001
(0.54)
-0.006
(-0.76)
0.674*
(1.82)
Yes
Yes
144
16
0.882
0.022
0.717

(4)
Weight VII
0.429***
(2.63)
0.576***
(2.90)
0.034***
(3.06)
-0.083**
(-1.98)
0.070†
(1.51)
-0.085***
(-3.65)
-0.008
(-0.28)
-0.299***
(-3.34)
-0.111***
(-2.84)
0.008*
(1.81)
0.001
(0.59)
-0.004
(-0.49)
0.817***
(3.30)
Yes
Yes
144
16
0.325
0.031
0.964

(5)
Weight VIII
0.669***
(6.99)
0.320***
(3.61)
0.015***
(2.61)
-0.127**
(-2.18)
0.156**
(2.03)
-0.065***
(-3.24)
0.024
(1.44)
-0.209***
(-2.66)
-0.058**
(-2.46)
0.001
(0.29)
0.001
(0.53)
-0.003
(-0.89)
0.623**
(2.40)
Yes
Yes
144
16
0.322
0.005
0.946

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1995-2004. Models are estimated by system
GMM estimator. I−it and M T RE−it−1 are the weighted averages of values of the competing states
(all other states)’ public input expenditures and marginal tax rate of equalization respectively. I−it is
instrumented by weighted real GDP per capita, weighted openness, weighted budget surplus, weighted
public debt, and weighted population density. The lagged dependent variable is instrumented by higherorder lags (restricted to t − 3 to t − 4) of the dependent variable. The remaining explanatory variables
are considered to be exogenous and therefore also included in the instrument matrix. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. † represent significance at the 10% level under one-tail
test.
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